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IMPLICATIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291 FOR 
DISCRETION IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION* 
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John B. Braden *** 
David W. Martin **** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A major criticism of federal regulations is that they often im-
pose significant burdens, in the form of additional costs, on the 
parties affected. 1 In recent years, the Executive branch of the 
federal government has attempted to address this criticism. The 
first effort came in 1974 when President Ford instructed agencies 
to provide a general discussion of the economic implications of 
certain proposed regulations.2 Four years later President Carter 
• The authors are indebted to V. Kerry Smith and Roger W. Findley for very helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. Allen Basala, Ann Fisher, Arthur Frass, Jim Hibbs, and 
Jeff Kolb provided helpful documents and guidance. Although the information in this 
document has been funded in part by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under 
assistance agreement CR-811059-01-1 to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
it does not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency and no official endorsement should 
be inferred. Professor Braden was also supported in this research by a fellowship from 
the University of Illinois Center for Advanced Study. 
** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Illinois State University. B.S., 
Colorado State University, 1980; M.S., University of Illinois, 1983; Ph.D., University of 
Illinois, 1984. 
*** Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Affiliate, Insti-
tute for Environmental Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. B.A., 
Miami University (Ohio), 1972; M.S., University of Wisconsin, 1976; M.A., University of 
Wisconsin, 1978; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1979. 
*.** Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Davidson College. B.A., Depauw 
University, 1979; M.S., Illinois State University, 1981; Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1984. 
I Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) cites these burdens as the impetus 
for its enactment. See 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193 [hereinafter cited as E.O. 12,291]. This 
criticism is also noted in Sunstein, Cost-Benefii Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1981). 
2 See Exec. Order No. 11,821,39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974). 
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signed Executive Order 12,0443 which required an analysis of the 
economic impacts of "significant" regulations.4 The latest attempt 
to address the high costs associated with federal regulations is 
Executive Order 12,291 (E.O. 12,291) issued by the Reagan Admin-
istration in 1981.5 
While E.O. 12,291 was designed to address the economic bur-
dens generated by federal regulation, it has been met with mixed 
reactions. The issues that have arisen range from the constitu-
tionality of the Executive Order6 to the question of its true intent. 7 
The question of the constitutionality of E.O. 12,291 has focused on 
the issue of the separation of powers. Specifically, it is not clear 
whether the Order's requirement of an analysis of the benefits 
and costs of proposed regulations will interfere with, and in effect 
nullify, specific Congressional mandates.8 With respect to the ac-
tual intent of the Order, it has been speculated that E.O. 12,291 is 
more concerned with merely reducing the volume and scope of 
regulations than it is with improving the efficiency of regula-
tions.9 
E.O. 12,291 was a major element of President Reagan's program 
of regulatory relief. 10 It ostensibly is intended to improve the 
overall quality and effectiveness of new and existing regulations 
with respect to economic efficiency. To achieve this goal, the 
Order calls for the selection of regulatory objectives that will 
maximize social net benefits; documented analysis is required to 
support that selection.H In particular, E.O. 12,291 requires a Reg-
3 See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). 
4 According to Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978), the purpose of a 
"regulatory analysis" is to consider the economic effects of the proposed regulation. 
"Significant" regulations are defined in E.O. 12,044 as those regulations that would 
result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, or a major increase in 
costs or prices for individual industries, levels of government, or geographic regions. 
5 Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
6 See, e.g., Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of 
Agency Rulemaking Under E.O. 12291,80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981); Sunstein, supra note 
1. 
7 See Grubb, Wittington & Humphries, The Ambiguities of Cost-Benefit Analysis: An 
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Analyses Under Executive Order 12291 in ENVIRON-
MENTAL POllCY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER: THE ROLE OF BENEFIT COST 
ANALYSIS (V. Kerry Smith ed. 1984)[hereinafter cited as Grubb]. See also Sunstein, supra 
note 1, at 1276-77. 
8 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1281; Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 195-234. 
9 Grubb, supra note 7, at 22, 58. 
10 Id. at 1. 
" Exec. Order No. 12,291, 45 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
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ulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) of all "major" regulations. 12 Under 
the Order, every RIA must include a description of the benefits, 
costs, and net benefits of the proposed regulation, and a de scrip--
tion of alternative methods for achieving the same regulatory 
goal at a lower cost with reasons why such alternatives cannot be 
adopted. 13 
E.O. 12,291 appears, then, to address the economic consid-
erations that are relevant to improving the efficiency of federal 
regulations. However, closer analysis suggests that there is con-
siderable room for variation in the implementation of the Execu-
tive Order's requirements. It has been noted elsewhere that, 
[t]he rhetoric of costs and benefits ... might be understood as 
something very different: a convenient and workable means 
of assuring that regulatory decisions are controlled by the 
President ... The very indeterminacy of the order tends to 
support this view. The order defines neither benefits or costs. 
In this respect, the order accords enormous discretion to 
those who are charged with interpreting it.14 
The purpose of this article is to show that Executive Order 
12,291 provides insufficient guidance to ensure that inefficient 
regulations will be avoided. Due to vagueness in the Order, ad-
ministrative agencies are forced to make important decisions con-
cerning when and how to conduct RIAs. Considerations other 
than efficiency may easily enter into these decisions and under-
mine the intent of the Order. 15 These issues are explored with 
reference to regulations issued by the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA). 
The wording of almost any legislative or quasi-legislative man-
date must·be somewhat general if it is to be applicable to hetero-
geneous actors. Directives issued to administrative agencies are 
an excellent example because regulatory objectives vary substan-
tially between the agencies. However, there are instances when 
the wording in E.O. 12,291 is so general that agencies are left with 
insufficient guidance. Consequently, important facets of the deci-
12 Id. at 13,194. For a discussion of what constitutes a "major" regulation, see text and 
note at note 47. 
13 Id. at 13,194. 
14 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1276. 
15 It should be noted that we are not concerned here with the actual intent behind the 
issuance of E.O. 12,291. Nor is any specific intent assumed in the analysis which follows. 
Rather, we indicate ways in which concerns that diverge from efficiency may affect the 
regulatory process. 
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sion making process remain subject to considerable agency dis-
cretion. These include selection and analysis of the regulatory 
alternatives which are to be considered in a given rule making, 
and determination of whether a proposed regulation is "major," 
and hence requires an RIA. 
Sections 1(b) and 2 of E.O. 12,291 serve as focal points for assess-
ing the extent to which agency discretion is possible. Section 1(b) 
lists the procedures for determining the priority of a proposed 
regulation, i.e., whether it is to be considered a "major" regula-
tion. Section 2 outlines the general requirements all agencies 
must follow when promulgating new regul,ations, reviewing exist-
ing regulations, and developing legislative proposals. The analysis 
of these two sections reveals numerous areas in which the Execu-
tive Order contains ambiguities that must be sorted out by 
agency personnel responsible for performing regulatory impact 
studies. 
Assessing the response of administrative agencies to the Order 
contributes to an understanding of the impacts of E.O. 12,291. 
Therefore, this article also examines the response of the EPA to 
E.O. 12,291, with particular emphasis on how the EPA has exer-
cised its discretion in the selection and analysis of regulatory 
alternatives. It will be demonstrated that EPA's long standing 
practice of applying economic analysis in its rulemaking process is 
expanded under E.O. 12,291,16 as the agency has developed an 
extensive set of guidelines which outline the procedures to be 
followed in developing preliminary and final RIAs.17 
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is largely respon-
sible for overseeing the implementation of E.O. 12,291. Section 6 of 
the Order states, in part: 
(a) To the extent permitted by law, the Director [of OMB] 
shall have authority, subject to the direction of the Task 
Force, to: 
16 A number of RIAs performed by the EPA were reviewed in this analysis. See infra 
note 61. Additionally, in the process of developing environmental impact statements of 
specific regulations prior to the issuance of E.O. 12,291, EPA considered economic im-
pacts of the proposed regulation as well. For a general discussion of these documents, see 
infra note 71. 
17 U.S. EPA, DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES]. 
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(1) Designate any proposed or existing rule as a major rule in 
accordance with Section 1(b) of this Order; 
(2) Prepare and promulgate uniform standards for the iden-
tification of major rules and the development of Regulatory 
Impact Analyses ... 
(6) Develop procedures for estimating the annual benefits 
and costs of agency regulations, on both an aggregate and 
economic or industrial sector basis, for purposes of compiling 
a regulatory budget. 18 
317 
Section 6(a)(1) empowers the OMB to designate specific rules as 
"major" thus subjecting those rules to an RIA. Pursuant to the 
Order, the OMB can override the determination of individual 
agencies with respect to the priority of specific regulations. How-
ever, there are few documented instances where the OMB has 
exercised this latter power.19 
. The remainder of section 6 gives the OMB the authority to 
develop guidelines for agencies to follow in the preparation of 
RIAs. To date, the OMB's guidelines have consisted of a memo 
entitled, Interim Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidance. ~o It out-
lines the basic elements to be included in an RIA, concentrating 
on the types of regulatory alternatives that should be consid-
ered. ~I However, the memo suffers from a lack of detail and the 
failure to discuss how the criteria of section 1(b), which identify a 
given regulation as "major," should be applied. Consequently, the 
OMB has come under fire from both the General Accounting 
Office (GAO)22 and others23 for its lack of effective effort in fulfill-
ing its duties pursuant to E.O. 12,291. 
As a consequence of the lack of guidance from the OMB on 
18 Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. at 13,196 (1981). The Task Force, mentioned in 
section 6(a), refers to the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. For a description 
of the activities of the Task Force, see PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY 
REUEF, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ACIDEVEMENTS IN REGULATORY RELIEF FOR STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, A PROGRESS REPORT (1982). 
19 Grubb, supra note 7, at 18-19. 
20 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, INTERIM REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
GUIDANCE (1981) (memorandum). 
21 There are four major categories of alternatives to be considered according to OMB: 
1) the consequence of having no federal regulation; 2) any major alternatives that lie 
beyond the scope of the legislative provision being responded to; 3) alternatives within 
the scope of the specific legislative provision; and 4) alternative, market-oriented regula-
tions. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 20, at 2-3. 
22 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED QUALITY, ADEQUATE RESOURCES, AND 
CONSISTENT OVERSIGHT NEEDED IF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IS TO HELP CONTROL COSTS 
OF REGULATION GAO/PAD-83-6, 51 (1981). 
23 Grubb, supra note 7, at 16-17. 
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matters relating to the Executive Order, administrative agencies 
have been left with a considerable amount of control over how 
they will approach the task of complying with E.O. 12,291. The 
following subsections identify specific areas where agencies have 
been left to their own interpretations and examine the effects 
that agency discretion in these areas may have on the quality of 
regulations. The areas identified include the selection of regula-
tory options to be considered in the RIA, interpretation of the 
results of the analysis of the options considered, and the budget-
ing of funds for the performance of RIAs. 
A. Choosing Among Regulawry Options 
The stated objective of E.O. 12,291 is to reduce the burdens of 
existing and future regulations and encourage well-reasoned 
regulations. ~4 Section 2 of the Order requires that all regulations 
be formulated such that: 
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate in-
formation concerning the need for and consequences of pro-
posed government action; 
(b) ... the potential benefits to society for the regulation 
outweigh the potential costs; 
(c) ... regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the 
net benefits to society; 
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory 
objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to soci-
ety shall be chosen; and 
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of 
maximizing the aggregate net benefits to society, taking into 
account the condition of the particular industries affected by 
the regulations, the condition of the national economy, and 
other regulatory options contemplated for the future. 25 
Subsections 2(a) and (b) attempt to ensure that new regulations 
will not reduce the level of net benefits (or welfare) currently 
enjoyed by society as a whole. While the intent of these stipula-
tions is straightforward, the procedures and methods for imple-
menting them are difficult, and in many cases, subject to substan-
tial professional judgment by the analyst. Specifically, a number 
of problems are associated with cost-benefit analysis, not the least 
of which is defining what impacts are to be considered. When all of 
24 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193 (1981). 
25 I d. at 13,393-94. 
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the impacts are identified, there is still the problem of measure-
ment and interpretation of the impacts. Additional problems 
which arise include identification of the appropriate discount rate 
to be used, the methods to be used in measuring the various costs 
and benefits, and the question of how to treat considerations that 
cannot easily be quantified.:26 
To satisfy subsections 2(c) and (d) simultaneously, agency deci-
sion makers must select a range of potential regulatory objectives 
for the specific problem under consideration. In the area of envi-
ronmental regulation, this range might take the form of several 
different concentrations of a particular pollutant to be permitted 
in a given area. Once the specific concentration levels are iden-
tified, the analyst must undertake a series of "cost-effectiveness" 
analyses to identify the least costly method of achieving each 
concentration leveF7 These analyses will satisfy subsection 2(d). 
N ext, the total benefits associated with each concentration level 
must be estimated. Finally, net benefits at each level must be 
calculated using the least costly alternative identified in each of 
the cost-effectiveness analyses. According to subsection 2(c), the 
concentration level (i.e., the objective) yielding the greatest net 
benefits should then be chosen. 
The apparent intent of subsection 2(e) is to direct agencies to 
those areas where the gains (e.g., improvements in environmental 
quality, human health and safety) from additional regulation will 
be greatest. This criterion appears to warrant trade-offs between 
the maximization of aggregate net benefits and the economic 
well-being of particular sectors of the economy, such as individual 
industries. This suggests a conflict between subsections 2(c) and 
26 For a general discussion of these issues, see E. MISHAN, COST-BENEF1T ANALYSIS 
(1976). For a more general critique of the use of cost-benefit analysis in public policy 
decisions, see S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT (1981). See also H. PESKIN & E. PESKIN, COST-BENEF1T ANALYSIS AND WATER 
POLLUTION POlJCY (1957); E. GRAMlJCH, BENEF1T-COST ANALYSIS OF GoVERNMENT 
PROGRAMS (1981). 
27 The meaning of the phrase "cost-effectiveness" (CE) varies between specific applica-
tions. See, e.g., T. Walton & A. Basala, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Environmental 
Quality Management, No. 81-59.3, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. (Paper 
presented at the 74th Meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association.) 
Cost-effectiveness is intended here to refer to the situation where we are measuring 
and comparing the total costs of different means of achieving the same end result. In the 
instant case, the objective of CE analysis is to identify the least cost method of achieving 
a given concentration level of a particular pollutant. Note that the least cost method, i.e. 
pollution control technique, may vary over the different concentration levels considered. 
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2(e). Assume, for example, that the estimated national benefits of 
a particular level of control far outweigh the costs incurred, and 
that the proposed regulation is the least-cost alternative for 
achieving that control level. Assume also that the regulation will 
have substantial adverse effects on an industry which provides a 
large share of employment opportunities in a concentrated area. 
If the adverse effects manifest themselves in the form of high 
regional unemployment, it is inevitable that subsections 2(c) and 
(e) will conflict. What is not clear is how such a conflict is to be 
resolved. 
If observed, the procedures required by Section 2 will lead to the 
formulation of economically efficient regulations. Those proce-
dures, however, may entail significant administrative costs. As-
suming that agencies utilize available resources in an efficient 
manner,28 increasing the precision of the estimated benefits and 
costs will necessarily be accompanied by an increase in adminis-
trative costS.29 On the other hand, increased precision also in-
creases the likelihood of correctly ranking the regulatory alterna-
tives. Assuming a constant or increasing demand for administra-
tive rulemakings, attempts to reduce administrative costs may 
also reduce the probability of identifying the optimal regulatory 
alternative, and hence the positive impact of section 2 on the 
regulatory process. 
Based on the preceding analysis, section 2 of E.O. 12,291 seems 
to provide appropriate criteria for the formulation of economically 
efficient regulations. Upon closer analysis, however, it can be 
demonstrated that the Order, while complying with the require-
28 It should be noted that were it the case that agencies are not using available 
resources in an efficient manner, increased precision in the estimation process could be 
achieved without any increase in the operating budget. 
29 The relationship between the precision of cost estimates and the level of expendi-
tures in the estimation process has been analyzed by others. As an example, consider the 
following table: 
Typical Costs For Preparing Estimates of Major Process Equipment 
December, 1980 ($x1()3) 
Type of Estimate 
Order of Magnitude 
Budget 
Definitive 
Cost of Project ($ X 106) 
Less Than 
Accuracy Range, % 1.0 1.0-5.0 
-30 to +50 7.5-20 17.5-45 
-15 to +30 20-50 45-85 
-5to+15 35-85 85-175 
5.0-50.0 
30-60 
70-130 
150-130 
See A. PicuJik, & H. Diaz, Cost Estimating for Major Process Equipment, 84 CHEM. ENG. 
106 (1977). 
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ments of section 2, provides at least three areas where agency 
personnel· can influence the composition and outcome of the 
rulemaking process. First, viable regulatory objectives may be 
excluded from the analysis. Specifically, the wording of particular 
sections of E.O. 12,291 may be interpreted as permitting the ex-
clusion of certain regulatory alternatives from explicit consider-
ation in the RIA. Second, different judgments concerning the ef-
fects of a particular regulatory option may significantly influence 
the selection process. The point here is that, depending upon the 
assumptions made in the analysis, very different results can be 
generated concerning a proposed plan of regulatory action. Fi-
nally, the amount of money allocated for the formulation and 
analysis of a particular regulation may substantially affect the 
scope and quality of the analysis. Each of these points will be 
considered separately. 
1. Consideration of Regulatory Objectives 
The required contents of an RIA are insufficient to verify that 
all of the relevant regulatory alternatives have been considered. 
Specifically, with respect to alternative regulatory approaches, 
section 3(d)(4) of the Order requires that, in the RIA, the agency 
consider alternative approaches that could substantially achieve 
the same regulatory goal at lower cost.30 If it is assumed that 
"goal" and "objective" refer to specific levels of pollution control,31 
the implication of section 3(d)(4) is that the content of an RIA may 
not be adequate to conclude that the regulation selected 
maximizes society's net benefits. For example, there could be a 
means of achieving a different objective that is costlier to imple-
ment and conform to, but that generates greater net benefits 
(total benefits less the costs of achieving those benefits) to society 
than the regulatory option selected. However, the wording of E.O. 
12,291 does not require a detailed discussion of such alternatives. 
Hence, there is room for agency decision makers to exercise con-
30 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,194 (1981). 
31 As indicated in the text, the terms "goal" and "objective" are treated as synonyms 
herein since E.O. 12,291 makes no such distinction between them. Additionally, the 
terms "goal" and "objective" are interpreted here as referring to specific levels of 
pollution control. Section 2(c) refers to "objectives" that maximize the net benefits of the 
regulation to society. The point is that section 3(d)(4) could be interpreted as applying to 
a single level of control rather than the range of control levels potentially possible. If the 
former interpretation is adopted, selection of the economically efficient regulatory option 
cannot be ensured. 
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siderable discretion, independent of the constraints of economic 
efficiency and OMB review, in selecting a particular regulatory 
objective. In exercising this discretion, administrative agencies 
may promulgate regulations that generate less than the maxi-
mum amount of net benefits possible. Two examples serve to 
illustrate this point.3~ 
First, consider the EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis of the 
Final Environmental Standards for Uranium Mill Tailings at 
Active Sites.33 In this RIA it is noted that available methods of 
tailings34 disposal range from a simple earthen cover to the use of 
deep mines, resulting in varying degrees of radon emission con-
trol depending upon the method used. The RIA then goes on to 
state that: 
The readily available method of tailings disposal is covering 
th,e tailings with earth,. Other methods are possible but are 
also more costly. Therefore, this analysis limits the consid-
eration of isolation methods to tho~e involving earthen cov-
ers. However, it is recognized that some day other methods 
providing better isolation may becoUle economically competi-
tive.35 
I t should be stressed that the differences in cost between earthen 
coverings and its alternatives are not discussed in any detail 
elsewhere in the document. Thus, by simply dismissing alterna-
tive isolation methods, this RIA considers only varying depths of 
32 With respect to the general issue of alternative selection and analysis, a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) review of 19 RIAs completed after E.O. 12,291 was issued noted 
that: 
In some cases, the range of alternatives considered was quite narrow .... With 
regard to the choice of alternatives that was made, there were cases where no 
clear comparison of the costs and benefits was used to justify the choice. In 
other cases, no reason was given for the alternatives chosen, or the comparison 
of costs and benefits of alternatives studied was incorrect. 
Strictly in terms of relative frequency, the rationale for choosing one alterna-
tive over another was the most serious continuing deficiency with the analyses 
conducted under the new Executive Order. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 54. This statement is consistent with 
our conclusion that the exercise of discretionary powers may result in the dismissal or 
neglect of feasible objectives on grounds other than efficiency. For additional arguments 
supporting this conclusion, see Grubb, supra note 7, at 32. 
33 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS FOR URANIUM MILL TAILINGS AT ACTIVE SITES, 
EPA 520/1-83-010 (1983). 
34 Tailings are the unconsolidated waste generated in the process of separating valu-
able minerals from the raw mined materials. 
35 OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at 3-3. 
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earthen covers as regulatory alternatives regardless of whether 
the additional alternatives are, in fact, more efficient. 
A second example of this problem is found in the Regulatory 
Impact Analysis of the Effluent Limitations Guidelines Regula-
tion for the Iron and Steel Industry.36 In this RIA only the pro-
posed regulation was actually analyzed. According to a GAO re-
port, the EPA maintained that analysis of additional alternatives 
was precludeq by court imposed time constraints.37 It was the 
GAO's opinion, however, that additional alternatives could have 
been considered without significant additional expenditures.38 
The implication of the GAO's comments is that the EPA's analysis 
was insufficient to conclude that the proposed regulation would 
maximize society's net benefits.311 
2. Consideration of Economic Impacts 
Executive Order 12,291 requires analysis of the impacts ofregu-
lations on affected industries and consumers, government agen-
cies, national and regional economic conditions, domestic and for-
eign competition, investment, productivity, and innovation.40 
Such analysis requires that economic conditions and impacts be 
forecasted. Economic forecasting is an imprecise art requiring 
substantial subjective judgments to be made by the professional 
36 OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES REGULATION FOR THE IRON AND 
STEEL INDUSTRY (1982). 
37 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS HAS LIMITATIONS, BUT 
CAN STILL PROVE USEFUL IN AsSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 4, 25-26 (1984). 
38 Id. at 26. 
39 For proposed regulations where an RIA is not required, the potential for discretion 
in the rulemaking process is even greater. Consider the analysis of the EPA's proposed 
rule governing pesticide registration proceedings. According to the EPA, this rule was 
not major and hence a RIA was not necessary. However, the analysis of the regulation 
was performed according to the OMB's guidelines for RIAs. In describing the analysis of 
the alternative RPAR initiation criteria (the subject of the rule) it is stated that, 
"[i]nformation on expected performance of the alternative criteria is from estimates 
made by Agency personnel who are familiar with the RP AR process. In many cases, only 
qualitative analyses could be conducted due to data gaps." OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PRo-
GRAMS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED RULES GoVERNING 
RPAR PROCEEDINGS; CRITERIA FOR THE INITIATION OF RPAR PROCEEDINGS 7 (1982). 
The point here is not to bring into question the ability of the agency personnel involved 
to make such estimates, but rather to note the potential for discretion to enter into the 
evaluation process. Obviously, in a case such as this, the effects of such discretion could 
be substantial. 
40 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193-94 (1981). 
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analyst. These judgments may influence the outcome of regula-
tory impact studies in significant ways. According to one expert: 
The major role professional judgment plays in assessing the 
merits of the available studies and making the many as-
sumptions necessary in developing these analyses is one of 
the more important factors contributing to the uncertainty of 
these estimates. Differences in professional judgment can 
have an appreciable effect on the magnitude of a "best" 
estimateY 
The relative attractiveness of regulatory alternatives may de-
pend on the subjective criteria used to establish economic fore-
casts. For example, assume that a particular environmental 
standard can be met by installing very expensive abatement 
equipment or by switching to new process equipment that utilizes 
non-polluting inputs. If the economic analyst believes that the 
industry is on the verge of a major program of investment in new 
process equipment, apart from environmental imperatives, then 
the regulation is likely only to accelerate this trend in a marginal 
way at modest additional cost. In contrast, a forecaster who 
foresees little new investment in the industry's production opera-
tions may conclude that the regulation will entail extremely 
costly additions of abatement devices. The two forecasters would 
reach very different conclusions concerning the economic impacts 
of the regulation. Hence, the assumptions made in the process of 
evaluating the economic impacts of proposed regulations may 
have a substantial effect on the number of RIAs actually per-
formed. 
3. Administrative Costs 
The costs of formulating and assessing specific regulations will 
vary with the availability of needed data and the scope of the 
regulation. Consequently, it is difficult to state conclusively how 
the amount of money available for a particular analysis will affect 
its overall quality. However, through the budgeting process, 
agency officials can affect the scope and quality of specific analy-
sesY For example, a limited budget might force the consideration 
41 A. Frass, Benefit-Cost Analysis For Environmental Regulation in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER: THE ROLE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
(Y. Kerry Smith ed. 1984). 
42 Grubb, supra note 7, at 16. In the EPA, the budget for an RIA is determined by the 
"Lead Office" that is in charge of the regulatory proceeding. For further discussion of 
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of a very narrow range of options such as those for which data is 
most readily available. Assuming that the costs of analysis in-
crease with the degree of effort necessary to complete the analy-
sis, the same limited budget might preclude consideration of al-
ternatives requiring substantially more effort to gather and ana-
lyze data. An example is the case where the options easiest to 
evaluate are those which require a minimum of change in the 
industry and hence a minimum of analysis. Alternatives that are 
more difficult (and presumably more costly) to evaluate include 
those which require very substantial changes in the industry 
affected by the regulation. A limited budget may preclude the 
consideration of such alternatives. 
Meeting the condition that the regulatory objective selected in 
a specific situation maximizes social net benefits requires consid-
eration of all relevant alternatives. Despite this necessity, the 
analyst's subjective judgments and budgetary constraints may 
cause some of the alternatives to a proposed regulation to receive 
only superficial treatment or be neglected entirely in the RIA 
process. Furthermore, there is no requirement in the Executive 
Order for documentation sufficient to support the chosen regula-
tory goal as being the optimum. Consequently, the requirements 
of E.O. 12,291 can, at best, ensure only that the regulation pro-
posed is the least costly means legally available for achieving the 
associated objective. This objective may not, in fact, be the one 
which maximizes society's net benefits from regulation in a par-
ticular area.43 
B. Determination of "Major' Rules 
Decisions about which regulatory proposals will require RIAs 
are important because they determine how much information will 
be generated and made available for public scrutiny in the course 
of promulgating regulations. Such information may elucidate 
strengths or weaknesses of a particular regulation that were not 
otherwise well-known. In addition, requiring an RIA may slow 
the EPA's procedures for promulgating regulations, see infra text and notes at notes 
69-85. 
43 It should also be noted that proposed regulations may be motivated by more than 
purely economic considerations. In general, "one must recognize the extent to which 
regulatory activity is a political process. Major rules submitted to OMB under the 
Executive Order have had considerable political or legal momentum. In comparison with 
the political interests that are brought to bear on these regulatory initiatives, economic 
analysis is a relatively frail instrument." See Frass, supra note 41, at 7. 
326 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:313 
down the process of promulgating regulations, thereby altering 
the momentum that characterizes regulatory proceedings. 
Executive Order 12,291 requires Regulatory Impact Analyses of 
proposed regulations that will have a "major" effect on the econ-
omy according to the following criteria: 
(1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. 
(2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, indi-
vidual industries, Federal, State, or local government agen-
cies, or geographic regions; or 
(3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, 
investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of 
United States-based firms to compete with foreign-based en-
terprises in domestic or export markets.44 
The Director of the OMB, despite authority to prescribe addi-
tional criteria for making determinations of major or nonmajor 
proposals,45 has not provided any such criteria in writing.46 In-
stead, the OMB has relied on consultations with agency officials 
concerning the significance of individual proposals. A necessary 
consequence of this approach is that agencies exercise primary 
authority in determining which proposals will be studied in 
RIAs,47 while the OMB retains final authority to accept or reject 
an agency's final determination.48 In the sections which follow, it 
44 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193 (1981). 
45 "Each agency shall initially determine whether a rule it intends to propose or to 
issue is a major rule provided that ... the Director [of OMB], ... shall have authority in 
accordance with Section l(b) and 2 of this Order, to prescribe criteria for making such 
determinations .... " [d. at 13,194. 
46 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 51-52. 
47 With respect to the determination of the need for an RIA, it has been said that, "[i]n 
determining which regulations are 'major' and thus require an RIA, agencies have 
concentrated on the definition of an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more, and ignored the other two definitions of 'a major increase in costs or prices,' and 
significant adverse effects on competition, employment .... " Grubb, supra note 7, at 19. 
The obvious effect of this is to induce a downward bias in the number of RIAs which will 
be performed. 
The fact that criteria 2 and 3 of section l(b) are, as suggested above, largely ignored, 
mayor may not be a serious impediment to the meaningful application of E.O. 12,291. 
First, agencies may realize a significant increase in administrative costs in the effort to 
evaluate proposed regulations according to these two criteria. Second, the use of am-
biguous phrases like "major increase" and "significant adverse effects" leaves room for a 
great deal of discretion in determining the effect of a proposed regulation. Third, depend-
ing upon the economic assumptions and methodologies employed, each proposed regula-
tion may be evaluated differently giving rise to an unequal application of the same 
criteria in different situations. 
48 See supra text at note 18. For a general discussion of the OMB's oversight role in the 
designation of rules as "major," see GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 
51-54. 
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can be illustrated that the the provisions noted above leave agen~ 
cies considerable leeway in deciding when to conduct RIAs. 
1. Ambiguity of "Effect" 
In applying the $100 million effect .criteria of section 1(b)(1), the 
Executive Order provides no guidance as to whether net or gross 
economic impacts should be used.49 Net economic impacts refer 
generally to the difference between gross costs and gross benefits 
of a given action.50 Interpreting the criterion as referring to net 
impacts will lead to fewer RIAs than will either gross measure. 
For example, assume that a proposed regulation is estimated to 
generate gross benefits of approximately $200 million and gross 
costs of $180 million. If either of the gross measures is used in 
applying the criterion of section 1(b)(1), the regulation is to be 
considered "major." In contrast, under the net effect interpreta~ 
tion the conclusion will be that the regulation is not "major."51 
In addition to the problems noted above. the vagueness of 
section 1(b)(1) admits the possibility of basing decisions whether to 
conduct RIAs on specific portions of overall economic impacts. An 
agency is not specifically precluded from employing in each regu~ 
latory proceeding the criterion that best serves the agency's 
interests concerning whether to conduct an RIA. An extreme 
position would be to consider only the agency's costs ofpromulgat-
ing and administering the regulation in question, rather than the 
overall costs and benefits of the regulation. According to one 
study, this approach is frequently taken.5~ Considering that the 
performance of a regulatory analysis under Executive Order 
12,044 cost an average of $212,000 in 1981,53 use of the agency cost 
49 "Gross" economic impacts refer to the total costs or total benefits of a given action or 
policy. 
50 See supra note 49. 
51 It has been argued by some that the $100 million limit refers to net social costs or 
benefits. Grubb, supra note 7, at 20. Elsewhere it has been interpreted as gross costs or 
benefits, whichever is larger. Frass, supra note 41, at 2. However, there is nothing in the 
Executive Order to support either interpretation as being the correct one. As such, 
agency decision makers can interpret section l(b)(l) in various ways. For additional 
discussion on the ambiguity of the $100 million criteria, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, supra note 22, at 51-52. 
52 Grubb, supra note 7, at 19. 
53 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 19. This cost estimate is assumeq 
here to constitute a lower bound on the average cost of performing RIAs under E.O. 
12,291. Note that this cost could increase by a factor of 470 and still faU below the $100 
million threshold of section 1(b)(l). 
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interpretation would almost surely result in agencies perl'orming 
fewer RIAs than would be perl'ormed under the gross or net cost 
criteria. 
2. Ambiguity of Superlatives 
Terms such as "major" and "significant," used in subsections 
1(b)(2) and (3), are not precisely defined in the Executive Order.54 
This ambiguity may result in interpretations of the impacts of 
regulations which differ among agencies and between cases 
within an agency. In either of the two situations (interpretation 
within or across agencies) the circumstances surrounding a given 
regulation could influence the agency's interpretation of the 
magnitude of a change in prices or costs arising from the specific 
regulation. As an example, a 50% increase in the price of some-
thing that costs only one dollar may not be interpreted as "major" 
while a 50% increase in the price of an item that costs $100 may be 
interpreted as "major." This may be true even if identical net 
economic benefits result from the regulations causing these ef-
fects. In addition, interpretation of "major" and "significant" may 
be affected by the projected distribution of the price or cost in-
crease among consumers and producers. For example, if the $100 
item is the major product of an industry threatened by foreign 
competition while the one dollar item is an incidental product of a 
diversified and prosperous industry, these circumstances would 
reinforce the disinclination to view regulation of the latter as a 
"major" action. 
Ambiguities in the Executive Order not only increase its vul-
nerability to subversion by agencies and analysts; they also per-
mit flexibility in administering the RIA process. The language 
may be stretched to encompass, for example, a proposed regula-
tion whose impacts may be serious, but not in one of the few ways 
ostensibly identified in the Order. 
3. Suggested Remedies 
The criteria in section 1(b) need to be general in nature if they 
are to be at all applicable to the many different agencies to which 
54 Without clear specification of the meaning of these general terms, application of 
sections 1(b)(2) and (3) is left wide open. For example, use of the absolute value of a 
change in some variable as opposed to the value of the percentage change in the same 
variable may lead to different conclusions as to the magnitude of the change in that 
variable. 
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they are directed. Still, agency decisions in the application of 
section 1(b) would be more predictable and consistent if the prob-
lems noted above were corrected. Concerning the $100 million 
annual effect criterion in section 1(b)(1), the Executive Order 
generally emphasizes avoiding unnecessary regulatory costs. 
Much less attention is given to the benefits of regulation.55 Conse-
quently, using gross costs as the measure of the annual effect of 
the proposed regulation may best reflect the implicit goal (de-
creased costs of regulation) of E.O. 12,291. Note that using gross 
costs as the standard for application of the $100 million criteria 
will generate more RIAs than will a net effect interpretation. 56 An 
alternative possibility is to limit the performance of RIAs to 
situations where an extreme imbalance of benefits and costs may 
arise. In this case, net benefits or costs is the appropriate crite-
rion. This second approach corresponds, in principle, to the Gen-
eral Accounting Office's interpretation of the intent of section 
1(b): "By requiring that cost-benefit analysis be prepared only for 
major regulations, the executive order is consistent with the phi-
losophy that such analysis be done only when the expected payoff 
is very high."57 The current wording of the Order invites the first 
interpretation, and the second interpretation is arguably the 
most important with regard to efficiency. The only obvious con-
clusion is that clarification is needed. 
The meanings of "major" and "significant" could be made more 
specific by providing benchmarks in the form of minimum per-
centage or absolute changes. At a minimum, such a clarification 
would increase the consistency and predictability of the priority 
determination process. Provision of such benchmarks would re-
move the need for subjective assessments of the predicted 
changes in economic variables, such as prices, employment im-
pacts, and trade balances, to which the terms "major" and "sig-
nificant" are applied. One would need only to compare the ex-
pected changes in the economic variables with the established 
benchmarks to evaluate the importance of each predicted change. 
The guidelines necessary to address the problems noted above 
should come from the OMB rather than the individual agencies. 
At a minimum, guidelines developed by the OMB would provide a 
55 The general tone of the Executive Order is evidenced in the preamble, which states 
that the objective of E.O. 12,291 is to reduce the burden (presumably costs) of existing 
and future regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193 (1981). 
56 See supra text at notes 50-51. 
57 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 37, at 3. 
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common basis for agencies to work from. This would better ensure 
consistency in the application of the Executive Order throughout 
all agencies. Consistency is important to the extent that it allows 
equitable treatment to different kinds of proposed rules and al-
lows for a more efficient use of resources.58 Left to their own 
interpretations, it is unlikely that individual agencies, responding 
to widely varying mandates, will develop consistent guidelines for 
the application of the $100 million criteria and the interpretation 
of the terms "major" and "significant." Some administrative 
agencies, notably the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
have attempted to clarify ambiguities in the Executive Order in 
the course of responding to it. However, for the Executive Order 
to be applied consistently, and hence effectively, such clarifica-
tions should be applicable across all agencies rather than in iso-
lated cases. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF E.O. 12,291: THE CASE OF THE U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) response to 
E.O.12,291 is of particular interest because of the EPA's history of 
evaluating the economic impacts of proposed regulations59 and 
the Guidelines 60 it has developed for agency personnel to follow in 
the development of RIAs. Additionally, given the wording of some 
of the laws to which the EPA must respond, questions arise about 
whether the Order is applicable to much of EPA's activities. 
This section examines how the EPA has responded to E.O. 
12,291 and, in particular, how the EPA's Guidelines handle dis-
cretionary issues such as those discussed in Part II of this paper. 
The discussion is based on EPA procedural documents, and on a 
review of four completed RIAs prepared by the Agency by late 
1983.61 Part A of this section addresses the applicability of E.O. 
59 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 22, at 5l. 
59 See supra text at note 16. 
60 See supra note 17. 
61 The four recently completed RIAs we reviewed for this study are: OFFICE OF 
RADIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF FINAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL STANDARDS FOR URANIUM Mn..L TAILINGS AT ACTIVE SITES, EPA 520/1-83-010 
(1983); OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES REGULATION FOR THE 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY (1982); OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, REGU-
LATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF PRoPOSED RULES GoVERNING RPAR PROCEEDINGS 
(1982); OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERING PESTICIDES UNDER THE FEDERAL INSEC-
1985] EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291 331 
12,291 to the activities of the EPA in light of the specific require-
ments of various laws to which the Agency must respond. Part B 
outlines the procedures followed in the EPA's rulemaking pro-
cess, emphasizing the treatment of regulations which lie within 
the scope of E.O. 12,291. Section C discusses how alternatives to 
specific regulations are selected and analyzed according to the 
EPA's Guidelines. 
A. EPA and the Applicability of E.O. 12,291 
It has been questioned whether the EPA is able, in many 
instances, to respond to the mandates of E.O. 12,291 without 
violating the requirements of statutes which govern its actions.6~ 
For example, courts have interpreted section 109 of the Clean Air 
Act63 as prohibiting the consideration of economic factors in the 
promulgation of ambient air quality standards.64 As such, any 
regulatory impact analyses performed under E.O. 12,291 in sup-
port of specific regulations subject to the restrictions of section 
109 of the CAA may be considered legally irrelevant to the prom-
ulgation of final regulations.65 If the information contained in 
such RIAs is not utilized, the performance of those RIAs consti-
tutes a waste of agency resources. 
In spite of the legal restriction on the consideration of economic 
factors in specific situations, the EPA does prepare cost-benefit 
analyses for significant regulations under the Clean Air Act. This 
is often done even though these analyses are not necessarily 
considered in setting environmental quality and emission stan-
dards.66 Performance of the regulatory analysis is in conformance 
TICIDE, FUNGICIDE AND RODENTICIDE ACT, EPA 540/9-82-013 (1982). As of December of 
1983, these were the only RIAs completed by the EPA that we were able to obtain via 
direct request to the EPA. 
62 For a discussion of the applicability of E.O. 12,291 to specific rulemakings by EPA, 
see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFlCE, supra note 37, at 15-19. 
63 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982). 
64 For references to specific cases, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFlCE, supra note 37, at 
15-19. 
65 Additionally, the Clean Water Act (CWA) directs the EPA to develop industry-
specific standards that reflect particular levels of pollution control that are technolog-
ically achievable. See infra note 105. While the CWA is interpreted as allowing cost-
benefit analyses of the proposed regulations for specific industries, consideration of the 
impact of regulations that span across different industries is not allowed. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFlCE, supra note 37, at 16-17. In both instances, the standards cited may 
be viewed as effectively precluding the consideration of relevant economic impacts in the 
promulgation of the necessary regulations. 
66 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFlCE, supra note 37, at 18. 
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with the Executive Order which requires that all major regula-
tions be evaluated with respect to benefits and costs. In those 
situations where it has been determined that such an analysis 
cannot be considered in the rule making process, the Order re-
quires that the RIA must indicate the specific mandate that 
forms the basis for that conclusion.67 In reviewing the EPA's 
practice of performing cost-benefit analyses which cannot be con-
sidered in the promulgation of specific regulations, a recent GAO 
report concluded that: 
cost-benefit analyses that are prepared but not used because 
of legal restrictions should be sent in summary form to the 
Congress in order to assist it in carrying out its oversight 
responsibilities. At present, however, no means exist to en-
sure that the Congress is made aware of such information.68 
The GAO's recommendation acknowledges that such information 
could be quite useful in reviewing current statutes and represents 
a waste of resources if such documentation is ignored. 
B. The Rulemaking Process at EPA 
EPA has developed an extensive set of rulemaking procedures 
for all regulations which are to be published in the Federal Regis-
ter or subject to OMB review under E.O. 12,291.00 The procedures 
are broken down into four phases: 1) notification; 2) development 
plan; 3) proposal; and 4) final rule.70 Table 1 summarizes this 
process.71 While the rule making process seems detailed, agencies 
67 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,194 (1981). 
68 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 37, at 21. 
69 The description which follows is derived from the OFFICE OF STANDARDS AND 
REGULATIONS, U.S. EPA, MANAGING THE PROCESS (1982) (EPA Regulation Manage-
ment Series). Additionally, in late 1983, the Office of Policy and Resource Management 
(OPRM) was reorganized and the Office of Policy Planning, and Evaluation (OPPE) was 
created in its place. We have assumed that the duties previously performed by OPRM in 
connection with the RIA process have been assumed by OPPE. 
70 OFFICE OF STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 69, at 1-5. 
7! In the process of formulating a specific regulation, the EPA also develops a number 
of documents which detail the various aspects of the proposed regulation. Economic 
information developed in the course of an environmental regulatory impact analysis is 
usually presented in three cost-related documents. In chronological order they are: a 
Development Document, an Economic Impact Analysis, and the RIA. Depending upon 
which office of the EPA is developing the regulation, these documents can have titles 
different from those just listed, or different analyses may be combined in one document. 
For example, the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards combines the develop-
ment document and the economic impact analysis into one document, the Background 
Information Document. However, the three document breakdown is a valid generalized 
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are at liberty to adopt their own methodologies and regulatory 
alternatives when performing specific RIAs. 
Phase 1 involves the submission of a Start Action Request 
(SAR) for all rulemakings subject to OMB review under E.O. 
12,291. 72 The SAR is filed with the Office of Standards and Regula-
tions (OSR) and then forwarded to the Office of Policy Planning, 
and Evaluation (OPPE).73 If the OPPE approves the SAR, it then 
works with the office in charge of developing the regulation (Lead 
Office) to classify the rule as either "major," "significant," or 
"minor."74 Finally, background materials on the environmental 
problem being addressed, a preliminary schedule, and a budget 
for the entire rulemaking process are prepared in the initial 
phase.75 
In Phase 2, the Lead Office is required to submit a Development 
Plan for all regulations classified as "major" and most regulations 
classified as "significant."76 The Development Plan is to include, 
(1) an explanation of why the rule is needed, (2) the goals and 
objectives of the rule, (3) a timetable and budget for develop-
ing the rule, (4) a summary of the key issues and regulatory 
approaches the Task Group will study in depth, and (5) an 
explanation of how the group will involve other agencies and 
the public in the rulemaking.77 
The Development Plan must then receive the approval of the 
Steering Committee and OPPE.78 The final step in Phase 2 is to 
representation of the regulatory cost assessment process. A fourth document may be 
issued to report the benefit analysis. 
A development document surveys the existing and potential waste treatment/control 
technologies for the pollution problem being addressed. A major purpose of this survey is 
to provide estimates of the costs to the individual firms of the various methods of 
achieving alternative regulatory objectives, including the one being proposed. Given the 
plant-level costs of the environmental regulation estimated in the development docu-
ment, the economic impact analysis extends the cost of the regulation to the economy in 
general. The focus of this stage of the analysis is on the measurement of society's welfare 
losses due to the regulation. The RIA summarizes the findings of the development 
document, the economic impact analysis, and any benefits document prepared for the 
proposed regulation. See Braden, Martin & Carlson, Cost Analysis Principles, Ap-
proaches, and Problems, Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, Staff Paper No. 16 (1984) (Revised). 
12 OFF1CE OF STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 69, at 1. 
13 Id. at 1. 
14 Id. at 1-2. 
15 Id. at 2. 
16 I d. at 2-3. 
11 Id. at 3. 
18 Id. at 3. 
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issue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to the 
Steering Committee for review and approval. The ANPR is a 
public notice seeking early public comment on the agency's intent 
to develop the rule in question.79 
In Phase 3 the proposed rulemaking package is drafted. In-
cluded in this package are the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM), preliminary analyses supporting the need for the pro-
posed rule making, a preliminary RIA, and an "Action Memo."80 
The proposed rulemaking package is then submitted for review by 
the Steering Committee, OPPE, OMB, and Senior Administrators 
(or their delegated assistants).81 Additionally, the NPRM is sub-
mitted for public review and comment.82 
In the final Phase the Final Rulemaking Package is drafted.83 It 
includes the Notice of Final Rulemaking (NFR), one or more 
supporting analyses, various technical documents, the final RIA, 
and an action memo requesting the Associate Administrator's 
approval of the recommended rulemaking action.84 The Final 
Rulemaking Package must be submitted for review to the Steer-
ing Committee, OPPE, OMB, the Chief or Deputy Chief of Staff, 
and finally the Administrator of EPA.85 
While the rulemaking review process is prescribed in detail, it is 
concerned with procedures and does not deal with the selection of 
regulatory alternatives to be considered in an RIA. Additionally, 
it is not made clear how rigorous or detailed the methodologies 
employed in developing and analyzing the regulation should be. 
Part C addresses these issues by examining, in detail, the regula-
tory alternatives to be considered in an RIA. 
C. Alternatives Considered in an RIA 
The EPA's Guidelines list four major types of alternatives 
which should be considered by all RIAs. They include: 1) the 
consequences of having no federal regulation, 2) alternatives 
within the legislated provision's scope, 3) alternative, market-
oriented methods of regulating (whether or not they are explicitly 
authorized in the Agency's legislative mandate), and 4) any major 
79 Id. at 4. 
80 Id. 
81 I d. at 4-5. 
82 Id. at 5. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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alternatives beyond the scope of the legislative provision under 
which the proposed regulation is being promulgated.86 
The first of these alternatives considers the ability of existing 
federal or state regulations, market forces, possible judicial 
mechanisms, and the potential for negotiated voluntary settle· 
ments to resolve the problem at issue.87 While this alternative 
corresponds, in principle, to the economic future of the industry 
without the proposed regulation, because it considers alternatives 
for dealing with the problem in question, it should not be confused 
with the regulatory baseline. The latter reflects the future of the 
industry in question in the absence of any type of remedial ac· 
tion.88 
The second set of alternatives may encompass various degrees 
of pollution control, compliance deadlines, and methods of en sur· 
ing compliance.89 While the EPA Guidelines emphasize the impor· 
tance of evaluating different control levels, they do not explicitly 
address alternatives that would achieve the same level of control, 
i.e., attain the same pollution reductions by different means. The 
only mention of alternatives of this latter type is in the discussion 
of the use of cost·effectiveness analyses.90 A manual prepared for 
use by the Economic Analysis Branch (EAB) of the EPA's Office 
of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) states that " ... 
control techniques representing equivalent stringency levels do 
not constitute different regulatory alternatives."91 (emphasis add· 
ed) This definition does not appear to be consistent with the 
requirements of E.O. 12,291, which states that the regulatory 
alternatives to be considered in the RIA are those which achieve 
the same regulatory goal at less cost.92 Consequently, the OAQPS 
may not learn of pollution control measures that achieve a de· 
sired result at a cost lower than that required for measures 
included in the study. In such cases, the Agency may settle for 
standards less stringent than those that would maximize net 
economic benefits. 
"6 GUIDEUNES, supra note 17, at 4. It should be noted that while these alternatives 
correspond, in principle, to those listed in the OMB's RIA guidance memo, the EPA 
guidelines are much more detailed and are backed up by a fair degree of supporting 
material. See supra note 21. 
87 GUIDEUNES, supra note 17, at 5. 
8" ld. at 13. 
89 ld. at 5. 
"" ld. at 19. 
91 JACA Corp., ANALYTICAL METHODS MANUAL, 2.3-5 . 
• 2 See supra text at notes 30-32. 
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The third set, market oriented regulatory methods, includes 
alternatives argued for by many economists,93 incluq.ing taxes and 
subsidies,94 transferable discharge. permits,95 and pollution 
offsets.96 Such measures afford considerable flexibility to those 
being regulated. For example, imposition of a tax on pollution 
emissions allows the polluter to select from a number of pollution 
control strategies, including reduced output and the use of vari-
ous pollution control technologies, and hence determine the re-
sulting level of emissions and the amount of the tax to be paid. In 
contrast, requiring each polluter to achieve specific performance 
standards, such as levels of emissions, forces the polluter to meet 
that standard or shut down. To the extent that the set of eco-
nomic alternatives includes options beyond the scope of the legis-
lated mandate, it overlaps with the final set of alternatives. 
The consideration of market oriented approaches has been ex-
tremely limited. Among the RIAs examined for this article, f17 the 
only example found was in the study of effluent guidelines for the 
iron and steel industry.98 There, the EPA considered how control-
ling overall emissions from a production facility, rather than from 
individual sources within the facility, could lower abatement 
costs.99 The final regulation allows for such an approach. lOo In the 
RIA it is noted that, "[t]his represents a significant departure 
from the EPA's previous approach to establishing effluent limits 
and could result in some cost savings to the industry."lol The RIA 
93 See w. BAUMOL & W. OATES ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY, AND THE QUAUTY OF LIFE 
217-82(1979). See also R. JUST, D. HUETH & A. SCHMITZ, Al'PUED WELFARE ECONOMICS 
AND PuBUC POUCY 275-78 (1982). 
94 For a general discussion of the use of financial incentives to control environmental 
externalities, see Blackman & Baumol, Modified Fiscal Incentives in Environmental 
Policy,56 LAND ECON. 417 (1980). See also JUST, supra note 93, at 275-78. 
95 For a description of the transferable discharge permit approach to pollution control, 
see Tietenberg, Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air 
Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis, 56 LAND ECON. 391 (1980). 
96 The most common example of a pollution offset is the bubble concept. For a general 
discussion of pollution offsets, see RCF, INC., EMMISION REDUCTION BANKING EXPERI-
ENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ApPUCABillTY IN ILUNOIS. (Study prepared for 
the Illinois Department of Energy and Natural Resources.) 
97 For a list of the RIAs we examined, see supra note 61. 
98 OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, supra note 36. 
99 This idea of controlling overall emissions from a facility (or in a region) is often 
referred to as creating an emission "bubble" within which stringent abatement at one 
source could "offset" emissions above the source-specific standards of another source. 
See RCF, INC., supra note 96. See also, R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 284-93 (1981). 
100 OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, supra note 36, at 17. 
10IId. at 4. 
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also noted that an analogous system of standards applied to 
several facilities in a region has been successfully applied in the 
EPA's ambient air standards program and is under consideration 
in the water program. However, according to the EPA, the 
multi-plant standard is currently not allowed by the Clean Water 
Act. 1O~ In this instance, analysis of market-oriented regulations in 
RIAs may actually contribute to pressures on Congress to change 
statutory provisions. Additionally, the Agency may operate the 
RIA process to serve goals which it views as desirable, such as 
directing the attention of Congress to additional means for ad-
dressing environmental problems. 
The fourth set of alternatives directs analysts to consider regu-
latory alternatives beyond the provisions of the legislated man-
date to which they are responding.103 It could be argued that such 
efforts constitute a waste of agency resources since rule makings 
based upon such alternatives would probably fail a court test 
under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. 104 
Consider, for example, the provisions of the Clean Water Act 
which direct the EPA to establish Best Available Technology 
(BAT) standards for various industries.105 In this case the objec-
tive is established by law and it is the Agency's responsibility to 
select the means best suited to achieving that objective. 
Technologies may exist which generate less of a reduction in the 
amount of effluents than the best available technology, but also 
generate greater net benefits from regulation. 106 However, it ap-
10' Id. at 17. 
103 GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 5. As is evident from the preceding discussion of 
market-oriented policies, those policies may actually be a subset of the fourth category. 
104 Section 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) lists the relevant criteria in 
the judicial review of administrative law. Specifically, section 706(2XA) states: "The 
reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; .... " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). In the example developed in the 
text, action could be brought by an environmental group charging the EPA with failure 
to develop regulations sufficient to achieve the BAT-defined level of control. Regulations 
which require less than the BAT level of control could be construed as being not in 
accordance with the law. 
105 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982) states, in part, "[iJn order to carry out the objective of this 
chapter there shall be achieved ... (2)(A) for pollutants, identified in subparagraphs 
(C),(D), and (F) of this paragraph, effluent limitations for categories and classes of point 
sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, which (i) shall require application 
of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class .... " 
106 The point here is that it is the difference between total benefits and total costs 
which, from an efficiency perspective, should be maximized; not the total benefits re-
gardless of costs. 
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pears that such alternatives are precluded from consideration by 
the Clean Water Act's requirement of the establishment of BAT 
standards. Despite these legal limits, such considerations by 
agencies may serve as useful signals to legislators when amend-
ing current statutes or when proposing new legislation. As an 
example, consider once again the EPA's analysis of the feasibility 
of the multi-plant bubble in the iron and steel regulations referred 
to above. 107 The conclusions reached by the agency could serve as 
evidence of a need for amending current water pollution control 
laws.l~ 
The preceding discussion indicates that the Guidelines improve 
substantially the guidance to EPA regulators concerning the 
alternative control levels and policies that must be included in an 
RIA. However, the evaluation of the effects of a proposed regula-
tion on specific industries and the national economy, along with 
the decision of whether to conduct an RIA in a specific instance, 
continue to be areas where EPA decisionmakers exercise sub-
stantial discretion. Moreover, because the Agency follows its own 
guidelines and receives minimal guidance from the OMB, the 
general problem of consistency between agencies in the applica-
tion of E.O. 12,291 remains unresolved. 1011 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analyzed current requirements for regulatory 
impact analyses of federal regulations, focusing on the activities 
of the U.S. EPA. The source of those requirements, Executive 
Order 12,291, contains ambiguities and qualifications that allow 
regulators to exercise considerable discretion as to when regula-
tory impact analyses are conducted, what approaches they con-
sider, and how they are done. An obvious weakness of the Execu-
tive Order is its failure to require an explicit analysis of the 
alternatives for achieving different levels of regulatory control. 
As a result, an RIA may focus on regulatory options that are 
politically or analytically expedient rather than considering al-
ternatives that may truly maximize the net benefits to society. 
The Guidelines issued by the EPA provide important clarifica-
tions concerning the issues to be addressed in RIAs. However, 
107 See supra text at notes lOF02. 
108 See supra text at note 68. 
109 See supra text at note 58. 
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they do not correct or clarify ambiguities in the Executive Order 
concerning when RIAs are required, nor can they substitute for 
directives from the OMB that might promote uniformity among 
agencies. As a consequence of this ambiguity, environmental reg-
ulators retain much control over which regulatory options to 
subject to regulatory analysis and which of the many economic 
impacts generally associated with a regulation are studied. 
Finally, an overriding aspect of the implementation of E.O. 
12,291, which is illustrated by the development of the EPA's 
Guidelines, is the almost total absence of formal OMB guidance 
with respect to the implementation of E.O. 12,291. This lack of 
guidance has weakened the effectiveness of the Executive Order 
by leaving broad portions of the Order open to discretion by 
individual agency decision makers including those at the OMB. 
With respect to the latter group, this discretion may allow the 
OMB to influence the regulatory process on a case-by-case basis 
and hence serve interests which go beyond the mandate to which 
the proposed regulation is responding. 
Should the OMB undertake the development of an explicit set 
of guidelines for the various agencies to follow in the implementa-
tion of E.O. 12,291, the minimum result would be to facilitate a 
more consistent, and hence predictable response on the part of 
individual agencies to the Order. This action would prompt 
suggestions on how to clarify both the intent of the Order and the 
guidelines developed by the OMB and, in so doing, improve the 
quality of federal regulations. 
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Phase 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
Phase 4 
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TABLE 1 
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES AT EPA 
Materials Prepared 
Lead Office prepares and submits 
1) a Start Action Request (SAR), 
2) a preliminary schedule and budget, 
3) works with OPPE to classify rule 
as "major," "significant," or 
"minor." 
Lead Office prepares and submits 
1) Development Plan 
2) Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking 
Lead Office drafts the proposed 
rule making package which includes 
1) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM), 
2) preliminary analyses supporting 
need for the rule, 
3) preliminary RIA, and 4) Action 
Memo. 
Lead Office drafts the Final 
Rulemaking Package which includes 
1) Notice of Final Rulemaking (NFR), 
2) supporting analyses, 
3) technical documents, 
4) the final RIA, and 
5) Action Memo 
Review By 
Office of Standards and 
Regulations (OSR) 
Office of Policy, 
Planning, and Evaluation 
(OPPE) 
Steering Committee 
OPPE 
Steering Committee 
Steering Committee 
OPPE 
OMB 
Senior Administrators 
Steering Committee 
OPPE 
OMB 
Chief/Deputy Chief of 
Staff 
Administrator of EPA 
